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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-FILING BY INFORMATION: DETERMINATION
OF PROBABLE CAUSE REQUIRED BEFORE EXTENDED RESTRAINT ON
LiBERTY-Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Robert Pugh was arrested in Florida without a warrant1 and
charged by prosecutor's information.2 Pugh and other incarcerated
arrestees charged by information without a preliminary hearing3
brought a class action suit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the charging procedure.4 Plaintiffs maintained that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required that
accused persons be accorded a determination of probable cause for
1. Although the record in Gerstein does not indicate whether the arrests involved
were made with or without warrant, see 420 U.S. at 105 n.1, the Court's discusson
is relevant only in the context of warrantless arrests. See In re Walters, 543 P.2d 607,
125 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975), where the California Supreme Court held that when a
magistrate has determined the existence of probable cause for arrest in an informal
ex parte proceeding before arrest (i.e., that results in the issuance of an arrest war-
rant), the Gerstein requirements are satisfied. 543 P.2d at 615, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
2. An information is an accusation in the nature of an indictment which is pre-
sented by a public officer on his oath of office rather than by a grand jury. The infor-
mation process begins when a police officer files a complaint with the prosecutor, either
after he has made an arrest (i.e., without a warrant) or before, as part of the proce-
dure to obtain a warrant. See, e.g., WASH. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.2.
On the basis of an officer's complaint the prosecutor makes an assessment of proba-
ble cause and decides whether to file the information, and if so, determines which
charges shall be made. The information is then filed with the clerk of the criminal
court. The accused is subsequently presented for arraignment where the charges set
out in the information are read to him.
In Florida the complaint is filed from one day to two weeks after arrest. The period
from arrest to arraignment (defendant's first appearance before a judicial officer) av-
erages 10 to 15 days, but can be extended for as long as a month. Deposition of James
Reagan, Jr., in Appendix to Brief for Petitioner at 43-60, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US.
103 (1975). In Washington a person arrested and not released must be taken before a
judge by the close of the next judicial day, and if a charge is not filed within that time,
the suspect must be released. WASH. JUSTICE CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.03. For good cause
shown, the court may extend the time prior to preliminary appearance.
3. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.140(a) (1973). Florida courts have held that the filing
of an information forecloses the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 106 (1975), citing State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172
(Fla. 1972). Preliminary hearings are also denied to persons confined under indictment,
420 U.S. at 106 n.2, citing Sangaree v. Hamlin, 235 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1970) and FLA.
R. CRIM. P. 3.131(a) (1973).
4. In most states that use this method the information cannot be filed until the ac-
cused has been committed (bound over) following preliminary examination in front
of a judicial officer or upon waiver of the examination. See, e.g., CALIF. CONST. art. I,
§ 14. In Florida, however, as in Arkansas, Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, Washington,
and Wyoming, a preliminary hearing is not required when an accused is charged by
information. Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
Consequently, in these jurisdictions individuals have been arrested, incarcerated, and
held for trial without the judicial determination of probable cause afforded by a pre-
liminary hearing. The determination of probable cause before seizure required by the
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detention soon after their arrest. 5 They also argued that the prose-
cuting attorney was not sufficiently neutral or detached to make the
necessary determination. 6 The district court accepted the plaintiffs'
arguments, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 8 and affirmed
the Fifth Circuit's decision in part and reversed in part. Held: Al-
though pretrial detention pursuant to the filing of an information
without a judicial determination of probable cause is an unconstitu-
tional violation of the fourth amendment guarantee against unreason-
able seizures,9 that determination need not be made at an adversary
proceeding. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
This note analyzes the Court's conclusion that adversary safeguards
are not required during proceedings conducted to determine whether
probable cause exists to hold an arrestee for trial. The Gerstein Court
held that a finding of probable cause to arrest is sufficient to justify
extended pretrial detention, so long as the existence of probable cause
is determined by a neutral magistrate. 10 It is submitted, however, that
the Court erred in looking exclusively to the fourth amendment to
determine the procedure and standards required in the Gerstein situa-
tion. Although the fourth amendment analysis is relevant in the con-
text of the initial arrest, it is not relevant in the context of extended
detention.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GERSTEIN COURT'S FAILURE TO
BALANCE PUBLIC AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
In Gerstein v. Pugh the Court ignored the fact that the fourteenth
fourth amendment in such states is deemed to have been made by the prosecutor filing
the information.
5. 420 U.S. at 107. See also Brief for Respondents at 6-7. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975).
6. Brief for Respondents at 8, id.
7. The district court had held that the Florida procedure violated the fourth and
fourteenth amendments because a prosecuting attorney could obviate the requirement
of determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate. Pugh v.
Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D. Fla. 1971). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed, holding on due process grounds that arrested persons detained pur-
suant to filings of informations are entitled to adversary proceedings to determine prob-
able cause. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
8. 414 U.S. 1062(1973).
9. The fourth amendment's guarantee against uneasonable seizures has been held
to be applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Mapp v. Ohio. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 420 U.S. at 120-21.
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amendment provides independent safeguards for an individual de-
tained during the pretrial stage of a criminal prosecution. "Without
doubt, [the fourteenth amendment] denotes . . . freedom from
bodily restraint."" When determining the required procedure in a post-
arrest detention situation, the Court should have looked to the four-
teenth amendment's due process clause as the independent source of
more stringent safeguards rather than relying on the less stringent
safeguards required by the fourth amefidment. Had the Court done so,
Pugh's situation could have been analyzed in a manner similar to sev-
eral recent cases defining procedures for protection against depriva-
tion of property and other significant benefits without due process. 12
By failing to apply the due process balancing procedures adopted in
such cases and instead looking to the standards required in the initial
arrest situation, the Court failed to adequately protect the rights of the
accused during pretrial detention. The Court should have balanced
the arrestees' rights of individual liberty against the state's interest in
incarcerating without procedural safeguards. The reason for the
Court's use of the fourth amendment analysis was its refusal to distin-
guish between initial seizure and continuing detention of a presump-
tively innocent13 person. Because the degree of deprivation imposed
upon an individual increases when he or she is detained beyond the
initial arrest, the fourteenth amendment prohibition against depriva-
tion of liberty without due process should govern post-arrest deten-
tions.
In determining what the fourteenth amendment required of the
State of Florida in relation to its pretrial detention procedures, the
Gerstein Court looked exclusivly to the fourth amendment for its
II. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1973). The Roth case involved
a university teacher hired for a fixed term of one year who was not rehired at the ex-
piration of the term. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not require
the opportunity for a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's
contract unless he can show he had a property interest in continued employment. 408
U.S. at 578.
12. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (temporary suspension of school
students); North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (garnish-
ment of corporation bank account); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (custody
hearings for unwed fathers); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of
driver's license); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (suspension of
privilege to buy liquor); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (revocation of wel-
fare payments).
13. See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.58.020 (1974) which provides: "Every person
charged with the commission of a crime shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt ...."
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definition of "due process." In so doing, the Court followed the tradi-
tion of the incorporation theory: 14 that is, the fourth amendment safe-
guard against unreasonable seizures was incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment and applied to Florida's pretrial procedures. The
incorporation theory differs from the "fundamental fairness" doc-
trine, 15 which analyzes a certain procedure and determines, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, which safeguards are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty."'16 Those procedures found to be implicit
are constitutionally required.
Neither of these two theories can be adequately utilized, however,
to determine what is required in pretrial detention procedures. The
incorporation theory is too narrow 17 to provide adequate protection
for the arrestee, and the fundamental fairness doctrine is too nebulous
and subjective for proper administration of justice.' 8 In recognizing
that the fourteenth amendment specifically forbids deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law, due process should be defined in
terms of all available precedents, not just in terms of a narrow range
of fourth amendment search and seizure cases. Examination of the
14. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 506-07 (9th ed. 1975): NI.
FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416-18 (2d ed. 1969).
15. For a recent discussion of the concept of "fundamental fairness." see Justice
Powell's concurring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Basically.
this doctrine finds no necessary relationship between the fourteenth amendment and the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The fourteenth amendment due process clause is
viewed as incorporating "traditional notions" of due process.
16. See, e.g., Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325
(1937).
17. See Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 929 (1965), where the author states:
The Court ought not to forget the reminder of one of its greatest members [Jus-
tice Holmes. dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan. 257 U.S. 312. 342 (1921)]: "Delu-
sive exactness is a source of fallacy throughout the law." However ardent the desire
may be. no facile formula will enable the Court to escape its assigned task of de-
ciding just what the Constitution protects from state action .... Mr. Justice Gold-
berg had it right when he said, at the previous term. [in Haynes v. Washington.
373 U.S. 503. 515 (1963)] "we cannot escape the demands of judging or of
making the difficult appraisals inherent in determining whether constitutional
rights have been violated." Especially in constitutional adjudication. "an unwilling-
ness to face the responsibility ofjudicial freedom in the name of a spurious objec-
tivity may also cripple the exercise of creativity." So let us hope. as true friends
of the Court. that in the fullness of time it will escape from the "verbal prison" it
has been building for itself by the selective incorporation doctrine, and will regain
the "sovereign prerogative of choice."
Id. at 937-38 (footnotes omitted).
18. Justice Black has argued that standards such as fundamental fairness grant an
unconfined power to the judiciary that is inapposite to the idea of a written constitu-
tion. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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broader range of fourteenth amendment cases' 9 reveals a due process
balancing analysis more applicable to the pretrial deprivation of lib-
erty than are the fourth amendment seizure cases used by the Court.
This due process conceptual analysis results in the requirement of dif-
ferent procedures and the employment of different standards in deter-
mining probable cause for post-arrest detention. This analysis, which
should have been applied in Gerstein, is developed in Part III. The
Court's focus upon the fourth amendment as its model for all pretrial
procedures also limited its analysis of the standard to be applied in
determining whether an accused should be detained beyond the initial
seizure. This problem is examined next.
II. THE STANDARD REQUIRED TO HOLD AN ACCUSED
FOR TRIAL
The Gerstein Court erred in viewing the situation before it in terms
of procedures surrounding initial arrest.20 The Court's use of the
fourth amendment analysis and its references to fourth amendment
cases, i.e., search and seizure cases, to determine what procedure
should be required are evidence of this error. Thus, the basic fault of
19. See, e.g., the cases cited in note 12 supra.
20. For instance, the cases cited by Justice Powell to support the majority opinion
that the "standards and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from
the Fourth Amendment" dealt with a government's power to initially arrest an individ-
ual. See 420 U.S. at 111, where Justice Powell cited Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291
(1972), Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 74 (1807), and Ex parte Burford, 7
U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806). Bollman and Burford were habeus corpus cases. In Boll-
man the Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to hold the defendant on
a charge of treason; therefore he could not be prosecuted or held. In Burford, the
Court stated that the jailer had no authority to detain the defendant unless detention
were justified by the arrest warrant. Since the warrant did not state "good cause cer-
tain" and was not supported by oath, it was defective and the defendant could not be
held. Both these cases focused on the validity of the arrest.
In Cupp the defendant voluntarily came to the police station after hearing his wife
had been murdered. The police did not arrest him, but took samples from under his
fingernails despite his protests. The formal arrest came one month later. The question
presented to the Court was whether the samples should have been suppressed as evi-
dence gained by an illegal search. The Court first decided there had been probable cause
to arrest the suspect at the time he voluntarily came to the police station and that the
search, if it had been incident to that arrest, would have been legal under the rule in
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court then held that the search was
lawful: "[C] onsidering the existence of probable cause, the very limited intrusion
undertaken incident to the station house detention, and the ready destructibility of the
evidence, we cannot say this search violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."
412 U.S. at 296 (emphasis added). Significantly, the Court noted that "the vice of deten-
tion" was absent. 412 U.S. at 294-95. Again, the conclusion was that the conduct in-
volved surrounded the arrest, not the post-arrest detention.
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the Court was that it failed to make the distinction between improper
arrest and improper deprivation of liberty. 21 Improper arrests can be
adequately analyzed by reference to the fourth amendment, 22 but
improper detention beyond the time of arrest calls the fourteenth
amendment into play.
A. The Difference Between Arrest and Post-Arrest Detention
The distinction between arrest and post-arrest detention is evident if
one concentrates on the' difference between the brief detention in-
volved in a street arrest and the extended detention (60 days23 or
whatever time is specified by the state speedy trial rule24) that follows
it in cases where the state decides to prosecute. To apply the same
standard to both situations is unfair to the individual.
The deprivation of liberty suffered by an incarcerated arrestee is
serious. Such deprivation "may result in . . . the degradation and
expense of a criminal trial and irreparable harm to the accused's repu-
tation, regardless of the ultimate outcome at the subsequent trial." 25
The fact that the defendant may be exonerated at his trial does not
21. See discussion of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972). Part II-D infra.
See also Justice Stewart's concurring opinion wherein he states that he "cannot join in
the Court's effort to foreclose any claim that the traditional requirements of constitu-
tional due process are applicable in the context of pretrial detention." 420 U.S. at 127.
22. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98. 100 (1959) ("[I]t is the command
of the Fourth Amendment that no warrants for either searches or arrests shall issue
except 'upon probable cause ... ' "); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1. 18 n.15 (1968) ("[T] he
Fourth Amendment governs all intrusions by agents of the public upon personal se-
curity. ... ): State v. Licari. 153 Conn. 127. 214 A.2d 900. 902 (1965) ("[l1t is
obvious that the amendment's reference to 'persons . . . to be seized' is inapt to refer
to anything other than a seizure of the person, which certainly is inclusive of an arrest.").
23. Washington requires that a defendant unable to obtain pretrial release be
brought to trial within 60 days following the preliminary appearance. WASH. SUPER.
CT. (CRIM.) R. 3.3(c). In Florida it was determined that defendants often spent more
than a month in jail before they were even arraigned, and then several more months
before their trial date. Deposition of James Reagan. Jr.. in Appendix to Brief for Peti-
tioner at 43-60. Gerstein v. Pugh. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
24. Speedy trial rules vary by state and federal rule according to amount of time
allotted and point in time the "right" attaches. See, e.g.. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 §§
103-05(a) (Smith-Hurd 1970) (trial must occur for those in custody within 120 days
of arrest): CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West Supp. 1975) (defendant must be brought
to trial within 60 days after the finding of the indictment or filing of the information).
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (b). (c) (Supp. IV 1975). signed into
law by President Ford on Jan. 13. 1975. provides that an information or indictment
must be filed within 30 days after arrest, arraignment must occur within 10 days after
the filing of the information, and the defendant must be brought to trial within 60 days
of arraignment.
25. Comment. Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due Process. 15 KAN. L.
REV. 374. 376 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
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significantly reduce the impact of the deprivation. The Court recog-
nized an analogous principle in Stanley v. Illinois,26 where the state
had argued that an unwed father was not entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before being deprived of his children because he
could regain custody as a guardian or through adoption proceedings.
The Court concluded: 27
This Court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a
wrong may be done if it can be undone. . . .Surely, in the case be-
fore us, if there is delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner
suffers from the deprivation of his children, and the children suffer
from uncertainty and dislocation.
This reasoning should be valid in criminal, as well as civil, cases.
That the arrestee is detained for a "short" period of time does not
alter the nature of the underlying deprivation of liberty. This was
made clear in Goss v. Lopez,2 8 which involved temporary suspension
of students from school. In Goss the Court stated that in determining
whether due process requirements apply, the nature of the interest at
stake must be considered most heavily. 29 The Court also mentioned
the length and severity of deprivation as additional factors that may
be taken into consideration when deciding the issue.
Thus, the severity of a deprivation, although not controlling as to
whether due process is required, may nevertheless be relevant in de-
fining the scope of due process in a particular instance. The law of
criminal procedure recognizes the validity of applying a sliding scale
of standards, with the most stringent standard being applied to help
test the most severe deprivation of liberty. For example, the standard
that the state must meet to justify interference with a person's liberty
ranges from the minimal showing in a stop-and-frisk situation that a
police officer had an articulable suspicion that "criminal activity may
26. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
27. Id. at 647 (citations omitted).
28. 419 U.S. 565(1975). See also North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 600 (1975), where the Court stated that although the debtor was deprived
(through garnishment) of the use and possession of its property only temporarily, the
seizure was not beyond the reach of the due process clause: "'The Fourteenth Amend-
ment draws no bright lines around the three-day, 10-day, or 50-day deprivations of
property. Any significant taking of property by the state is within the purview of the
Due Process Clause.' " Id. at 606, quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 86 (1972).
29. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. at 575-76.
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be afoot"30 to the substantial burden of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" applicable to a criminal trial.31
B. The Standard for Post-Arrest Detention: The Prima Facie Case
Test
Considerations of correlation between the stringency of standard
and the severity of deprivation dictate that the probable cause
standard32 traditionally applied to test the validity of arrests should
not be applied to test the validity of the more intrusive post-arrest de-
tention and criminal prosecution. In Goldsmith v. United States03 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized that
"[w] hat may constitute probable cause for arrest does not necessarily
constitute probable cause for a charge on arraignment. 3 4 In other
words, because the brief detention on the street or at the stationhouse
is a much different matter than the deprivation of liberty that occurs
when the full brunt of the criminal prosecution process is brought to
bear on the individual, a showing adequate under the fourth amend-
ment to justify arresting an individual may not necessarily be suffi-
cient to meet the fourteenth amendment requirement of due process
before a deprivation of liberty. Accordingly, due process dictates that
the prosecutor be held to a more stringent standard than that appli-
cable to the policeman on the street.
Before allowing the infringement of rights inherent in any post-ar-
rest detention and prosecution, courts should require the police and
prosecutor to show not merely probable cause to arrest, but rather a
reasonable possibility of conviction. This standard is sometimes re-
ferred to as the "prima facie case" test.35 Under this test, an accused is
not bound over for trial unless at the preliminary hearing the state can
produce the amount of proof needed in a trial to get the case to the
30. Terry v. Ohio, 393 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
31. In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
32. The showing required to justify an arrest is that at the time of the seizure, the
police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that a felony had been committed by
the person to be arrested. See Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court:
Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 664. 687 (1961).
33. 277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960).
34. Id. at 345.
35. F. MILLER, PROSECUTION 88 (1969).
432
Vol. 51: 425, 1976
Pretrial Detention
jury.3 6 A majority of the states appear to apply this more stringent
standard,37 but Washington has rejected it.38
Applying the probable cause to arrest standard to validate post-ar-
rest detentions in a grand jury system is justifiable because the accused
is detained under this standard only the relatively short period of
time39 until an indictment is returned by the grand jury, which tradi-
tionally operates under the prima facie case. standard.40 In contrast,
under the information system, the accused is not afforded the back-up
protection of grand jury review41 and consequently may be detained
and subjected to prosecution upon a minimal showing of probable
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. State v. Wright, 51 Wn. 2d 606, 608, 320 P.2d 646, 648 (1958) (standard at
justice court preliminary hearing is probable cause to believe accused committed a
crime).
39. See Graham & Letwin, The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field
Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 18 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 635, 686-88 (1971).
40. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) which contemplates delays of less than 10 days
between defendant's initial appearance and the return of the indictment. See also 1 C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 80 (1969).
41. The fact that the grand jury typically employs the more stringent prima facie
case test does not necessarily mean that the grand jury is the best possible device for
protecting the rights of the accused during post-arrest detention. As suggested in Part
III, application of the proper standard may be meaningless if the accused lacks the
opportunity to challenge the state's evidence in an adversary proceeding. The non-
adversarial nature of the grand jury leads some commentators to conclude that it acts
as a rubber stamp for the prosecutor rather than the check on prosecutorial power it
was intended to be. Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution
by Information: An Equal Protection Due Process Issue, 25 HAST. L.J. 997 (1974).
One commentator has noted critically:
Grand juries are likely to be a fifth wheel in the administration of criminal justice
in that they tend to stamp with approval, arnd often uncritically, the wishes of the
prosecuting attorney. At best the grand jury tends to duplicate the work of the
committing magistrate and prosecutor.
Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 363 (193 1). See
also 4 NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECU-
TION 124 (1931); Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment and
Information, 29 MICH. L. REV. 403 (1931); Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174 (1973).
One explanation for the Supreme Court's reluctance to use due process analysis in
Gerstein, thereby requiring an adversary hearing, may be its concern for the effect such
a holding would have on the grand jury system. Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attor-
ney General of Florida, argued to the Court that an information is tantamount to an
indictment, and that if the Fifth Circuit decision were upheld, the same objection could
be made with respect to grand jury proceedings. 43 U.S.L.W. 3245-46 (Oct. 29, 1974).
Justice Rehnquist inquired of respondent's counsel, "Aren't you asking for something
that is not even available in a grand jury proceeding?" Id. at 3246. Although the re-
spondents in Gerstein argued that a grand jury proceeding could be distinguished from
an information because of the grand jury's "historical nature," id., the due process
analysis recommended in Part III would apply to both.
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cause-a showing designed to govern the arrest process, not the
charging process. 42
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in its well-reasoned
Gerstein opinion, recognized the impropriety of lengthy detentions of
persons against whom the state lacked sufficient evidence for a suc-
cessful prosecution. 43 From a practical standpoint, it seems clear that
often more evidence is necessary to present a prima facie case than is
necessary merely to justify an arrest. 44 A majority of the Supreme
Court in Gerstein, however, over Justice Stewart's vigorous protests, 45
declined to recognize any distinction between initial arrest and post-
arrest incarceration. Gerstein therefore may require individuals who
perhaps have been arrested with good cause to remain in jail until ei-
ther the prosecutor decides not to press charges or a trial determines
he or she is innocent (bail considerations aside).46 It clearly should be
42. Arguably the fourth amendment applies only to the arrest process. while fifth
amendment principles should govern the charging process. Such an analysis would
seem to support the application of the broad principles of fourteenth amendment due
process to the charging procedure. One commentary has concluded that California's
application of the probable cause standard to the preliminary hearing is the result of
an oversight:
It therefore seems plausible to suppose that the probable cause standard for bind
over was derived from the same sources as the fourth amendment, in the era when
the commitment decision was concerned only with legality of the detention of the
defendant pending screening by the grand jury. There is nothing in the [Califor-
nia Constitutional] debates leading to the adoption of the information system to
suggest that framers of the preliminary [hearing] intended to make it easier to
put defendants on trial than under the grand jury system. It is thus likely that
the old standard for judging the legality of commitment pending screening was
carried over to the information system without any appreciation of the fact that
the preliminary hearing was now to perform the screening function.
Graham & Letwin. supra note 39, at 688-89 (footnotes omitted).
43. Pugh v. Rainwater. 483 F.2d at 783 n.12 (1973). noted in 60 VA. L. REV.
540 (1974).
44. It has been stated:
Probably in 99% of all cases submitted to the Prosecuting Attorney for considera-
tion. there would be sufficient evidence to meet the definition of probable cause.
but there is a tremendous difference between probable cause and the amount of
evidence that a Prosecuting Attorney considers necessary to justify bringing a case
to trial ....
Brief for Wash. State Ass'n of Prosecuting Attorneys as Amicus Curiae at 4-5. State v.
Kanistanaux, 68 Wn. 2d 652, 414 P.2d 784 (1966).
45. Justice Stewart observed: "[T] his case does not involve an initial arrest, but
rather the continuing incarceration of a presumptively innocent person." 420 U.S. at
127.
46. If an individual is released on bond, the "vice" of continued detention is ab-
sent. As the Court recognized, however, "[e] ven pretrial release may be accompanied
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint on liberty." 420 U.S. at 114.
Arguably, these restraints mandate an adversary hearing even for the arrestee out on
bail. Restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the arrestee may be
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improper, however, to incarcerate in anticipation of trial when there is
insufficient evidence to charge.47
Although it is not suggested that a full trial before detention is nec-
essary, there should be a fair assessment of the sufficiency of the
state's case prior to any extended post-arrest detention.48 This proce-
dure would supplement, not replace, the procedure required by Ger-
stein. The procedure required by Gerstein is similar to that of ob-
imposed. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)(2) (1970). Additionally, the federal statute
allows the judge to impose "any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to as-
sure appearance" including a condition requiring that the person return to custody
after specified hours. Id. § 3146(a)(5) (1970). Even the arrestee out on unconditional
bond is required to appear for trial and bears the stigma of criminal accusation. Cf.
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1970); see notes 69 & 70 and accompany-
ing text infra.
47. Even if a lawful arrest has been made, it does not necessarily follow that a
charge may be properly based upon the same evidence supporting the arrest because
the arrest may stem from "factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949) (warrantless auto search upheld). For a telling crit-
icism of the Gerstein Court's application of the Brinegar standard to the preliminary
hearing, see Note, 3 WESTERN ST. L. REv. 134, 140 (1975).
Although the choice of the proper standard at the proper time is vital to the admin-
istration of the criminal law process, American law is ambiguous on this point. Miller
& Remington, Procedures Before Trial, 339 ANNALS 111, 1"15-16 (1962). Miller and
Remington cite Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 456 (1957), as supporting the
proposition that the Court requires the same test for arrest as for charging: "It is not
the function of the police to arrest... at large and to use an interrogating process ...
in order to determine whom they should charge .... " Goldsmith v. United States,
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 863 (1960), is cited as expressing
a decidedly different view:
A vital factor to bear in mind is that as these steps progress the burden of the law
enforcement agency increases. What may constitute probable cause for arrest does
not necessarily constitute probable cause for a charge on arraignment ....
277 F.2d at 345, cited in Miller & Remington, supra, at 116.
48. Anticipated criticism of imposing this procedure include the argument that the
preliminary hearing (probable cause determination) will be a "mini-trial" and that this
imposes an unjustifiable burden upon the state. The standard at trial, however, is "be-
yond all reasonable doubt" while the suggested standard for the preliminary hearing
can best be defined as a "reasonable possibility" of conviction. The Court recognized a
similar distinction in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Bell involved a Georgia
statute that provided for the automatic suspension of the license of an uninsured mo-
torist involved in an accident unless the driver posted security to cover the amount of
damage claimed by aggrieved parties in the accident report. The hearing provided the
driver specifically excluded any consideration of fault. The Court held that the four-
teenth amendment due process clause required a hearing that considered fault:
Clearly, however, the inquiry into fault or liability requisite to afford the licensee
due process need not take the form of a full adjudication on the question of lia-
bility. That adjudication can only be made in litigation between the parties in-
volded in the accident.... [W] e hold that procedural due process will be satisfied
by an inquiry limited to the determination whether there is a reasonable possibil-
ity ofjudgments in the amounts claimed being rendered against the licencsee.
Id. at 540 (emphasis added).
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taining a warrant prior to arrest49 except that the Gerstein procedure
must come immediately after a warrantless arrest. The procedure re-
quired under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
however, would have to follow regardless of whether the arrest had
been made pursuant to a warrant, or whether probable cause was es-
tablished after the arrest as required by Gerstein, in order to protect
an arrestee against the deprivation of liberty caused by his or her ex-
tended pretrial detention.
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES A PRETRIAL ADVERSARY
HEARING IMMEDIATELY AFTER ARREST
The Court's erroneous application of the fourth amendment stan-
dard of probable cause to arrest to situations of pretrial incarceration
is only half the problem presented by Gerstein. The other half is the
Court's failure to require an adversary hearing to make the determina-
tion of probable cause, whatever the standard. The question is re-
duced to how much process an arrestee is due before he or she can be
subjected to extended pretrial detention.
A. The Reasoning of the Gerstein Court: Due Process Adversary
Proceedings Are Not Necessary for Post-Arrest Detention
The Gerstein Court stated that "adversary safeguards are not essen-
tial for the probable cause determination required by the fourth
amendment" where the sole issue is "whether there is probable cause
for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings."5 0 The
Court justified its conclusion by stating that since the standard is the
same as that required for arrest, "ordinarily there is no need for fur-
49. An arrest warrant is issued only when a judicial officer determines the existence
of probable cause to arrest, see WASH. JUSTICE CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.02(a). or when an
indictment is found or an information filed, see WASH. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.2(a).
An accused may also be arrested after indictment by a grand jury, for such indictment
itself establishes probable cause. See Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480. 487
(1958), where the Court stated that "[a] warrant of arrest can be based upon an
indictment because the grand jury's determination that probable cause existed for the
indictment also establishes that element for the purpose of issuing a warrant for the
apprehension of the person so charged .. "; and Beavers v. Henkel. 194 U.S. 73. 85
(1904), where the Court stated that "an indictment ... should be accepted everywhere
through the United States as at least prima facie evidence of the existence of probable
cause." An arrest without a warrant is valid "only if for a crime committed in the
presence of the arresting officer or for a felony of which he had reasonable cause to
believe defendant guilty." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
50. 420 U.S. at 120.
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ther investigation before the probable cause determination can be
made."51 The Court added that "[p] resumably, whomever the po-
lice arrest they must arrest on 'probable cause.' "52 This justification
for denying an adversary hearing is inadequate for two reasons. First,
as argued in Part II, the standard should not be merely probable cause
to arrest.53 Second, as the Court itself recognized in Stanley v. Illinois,
even though "procedure by presumption" may be easier and cheaper
than individualized determination, it cannot be tolerated where an
important interest hangs in the balance; 54 this concept should apply
whether that interest be continued freedom in the arrestee's case or
continued custody of one's child as in Stanley.
The Court also justified the denial of adversary safeguards by
stating that the consequences of the probable cause determination
were less serious than those stemming from a full preliminary hearing
as provided for by the procedures of some states.55 This justification,
however, is inadequate because the practical result in the two in-
stances is the same: the accused is held for trial. The Gerstein Court
should have either allowed room for a subsequent case dealing with
the fourteenth amendment issues (instead of indulging in dicta
showing their disapproval of such a future holding)56 or accepted the
arrestees' arguments based on the fourteenth amendment and used the
Gerstein case as an opportunity to outline the proper procedure.
B. Due Process Adversary Proceedings Are Necessary for Post-Arrest
Detention
Whether fourteenth amendment due process applies to a given pro-
cedure depends on the extent to which an individual may be con-
demned to "suffer a grievous loss."' 57 For procedural protection to be
51. Id. n.21.
52. Id.
53. See notes 35-42 and accompanying text supra.
54. 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
55. 420 U.S. at 122-23. The consequences of a more complete preliminary hearing
are the solidification of issues and testimony and the determination of whether the state
is justified in charging the accused. See Part III of the Gerstein Court's opinion. See
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), for a description of a state-afforded full
preliminary hearing and for the Court's treatment of it.
56. See 420 U.S. at 126-27 (Stewart, J., concurring).
57. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168
(1951) (organization brought suit to have name removed from list of communist asso-
ciations); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (deprivation of welfare bene-
fits); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (parole revocation).
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afforded, the individual's interests must fall within the language and
spirit of the fourteenth amendment: "nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law .... "3
Keeping in mind the distinction between initial arrest and pretrial
detention discussed in Part II, it is apparent that the requirements of
due process should apply at the detention stage. The loss an accused
suffers by virtue of being denied a post-arrest hearing is indeed
grievous. First, an arrestee is deprived of liberty5 9 in that he or she
might spend an extended period of time in jail awaiting trial. 60 Liberty
also encompasses the protection of an individual's "good name, repu-
tation, honor or integrity," and when this interest is threatened by
government action toward an individual, notice and opportunity to be
heard are essential. 61 Second, the arrestee might be subjected to an
unnecessary prosecution and trial because the charges are unfounded
or the detention illegal. A post-arrest hearing would give the accused
an opportunity to establish these facts.62 Third, pretrial detention
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Fuentes v. Shevin. 407 U.S. 67 (1972)
(procedure for replevin held to violate due process). where the Court stated: "The
right to a prior hearing, of course, attaches only to the deprivation of an interest en-
compassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's protection." Id. at 84.
59. Even if bail is available, the arrestee may nevertheless suffer financial hardship.
In one instance a suspected felon was arrested, jailed, and bail set at $10.000. After
bond was set, the arrestee paid $700 to a bail bondsman to meet bail. Although the
prosecutor subsequently determined at arraignment that sufficient evidence to charge
was lacking, the $700 paid to the bail bondsman was not recoverable. Interview with
Larry Lund. Law Reform Attorney for Seattle-King County Public Defender Office in
Seattle. Washington. Sept. 10. 1975.
60. This deprivation may take the form of actual incarceration or conditions in re-
lease. See note 46 supra. The California Supreme Court outlined the post-arrest pro-
cedure required by Gerstein in the case of arrested misdemeanants in In re Walters.
543 P.2d 607, 125 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1975). Regarding bail the court stated: "As the
posting of bail may impose an unwarranted burden on an accused if probable cause
to detain is lacking. the accused is entitled to have that determination made prior to
electing to post or not to post bail." 543 P.2d at 616. 126 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
61. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1970): Goss v. Lopez. 419
U.S. 565, 574(1975).
62. For the proposition that the preliminary hearing serves the purpose of elimin-
ating cases based on unfounded charges see Wells v. State, 234 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.
Cal. 1964): People v. White, 18 Misc. 2d 56. 188 N.Y.S.2d 585 (1959). For the prop-
osition that the preliminary hearing is an effective mechanism for determining the
legality of detention, see Anderson. The Preliminary Hearing: Better Alternatives or
More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970). See also Note. The Function of
the Preliminary Hearing in Federal Pretrial Procedure. 83 YALE L.J. 771 (1974).
where the author formulates two conceptual models of the preliminary examination.
the "backward looking" and the "forward looking." The first model is concerned pri-
marily with legality of arrest and validity of detention of the arrested person: the sec-
ond with whether there is sufficient probability of conviction to warrant further pro-
ceedings.
The underlying protective purpose of the preliminary examination formed the basis
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without a preliminary hearing may prejudice the accused's prepara-
tion for his defense. A hearing would inform the accused of the details
of the charge against him, thereby acting as a discovery device and
operating to fix the testimony of witnesses and set the basis for their
impeachment.6 3 Fourth, pretrial detention of the accused may preju-
dice the disposition of the case at trial. Studies have established a rela-
tionship between pretrial detention and unfavorable sentencing.
6 4
of the plaintiffs' complaint in Gerstein. It was plaintiffs' view that the historic reason
for the preliminary hearing was to "prevent hasty, malicious, improvident and oppres-
sive prosecutions, to protect the person charged from open and public accusations of
crime. ... Brief for Respondents at 19, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),
quotingThies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 189 N.W. 539 (1922).
63. This procedure was examined by the Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama.
399 U.S. 1 (1969), holding that if an Alabama preliminary hearing were determined
to be a "critical stage" of the state's criminal process, defendant would be entitled to
representation by counsel. In support of its holding the Court stated that the presence
of counsel at the preliminary hearing was "essential to protect the indigent accused
against erroneous or improper prosecution." Id. at 9. The Court indicated that discov-
ery and preparation of the defense were two vital functions counsel should perform.
The importance of the discovery function in the pretrial stage is recognized by
Washington in its omnibus hearing procedure. WASH. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 4.5(a)
provides for an omnibus hearing when a plea of not guilty is entered. One commenta-
tor notes:
[The omnibus hearing] eliminates unnecessary motion practice and effectuates the
discovery proces [sic]. Furthermore, the omnibus hearing allows the court
promptly to dispose of latent constitutional issues and affords the defendant the
opportunity to make an informed decision as to his plea.
Clark, The Omnibus Hearing in State and Federal Courts, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 761,
764 (1974). See also ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE
TRIAL § 5.3 (1970).
64. The Gerstein Court held that because of its limited function and nonadversary
character, the probable cause determination was not a "critical stage" of prosecution
which would entitle the accused to appointment of counsel. The Court observed that
"critical stages" are those pretrial procedures which have the potential to impair a
defense on the merits if the accused were required to proceed without counsel. 420 U.S.
at 122. For a well-reasoned attack on the Court's analysis of the critical stage issue,
see Note, 3 WESTERN ST. L. REV. 134 (1975).
The Court's conclusion that pretrial custody does not present a high probability of
substantial harm to a defense appears unfounded. Statistics on the relationship between
pretrial detention and unfavorable sentencing indicate that suspects detained in jail
before trial are sentenced to prison almost four times more often than those released
on bail. Persons accused and held in pretrial custody are convicted almost twice as
often as those released prior to trial. The following table illustrates the relationship
between pretrial detention and unfavorable sentencing:
Released Detained
Disposition On Bail InJail
Sentenced to prison 17% 64%
Convicted w/o prison sentence 36% 9%
Not Convicted 47% 27%
(Acquittal, dismissal or discharge on own recognizance)
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While an individual's post-arrest hearing may not necessarily result in
a finding of no probable cause to charge (and thereby require dis-
missal), such a hearing would be more effective than the cursory bail
hearing in offering the individual a chance to be released prior to trial
on his or her own recognizance. 65
It is apparent, then, that the accused has a substantial interest in a
post-arrest hearing. Once it has been determined that the due process
framework applies, the next question is the nature of the hearing to be
afforded, for the due process concept is flexible and calls only for such
procedural protection as each particular situation demands.
66
C. The Nature of the Due Process Adversary Proceeding
The Supreme Court has stated that "[i] n almost every setting
where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process re-
This table was compiled by Rankin and appears in her article The Effect of Pretrial
Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641, 642 (1964). The table also appears in Foote. The
Coining Constitutional Crisis in Bail: Part 11, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1125. 1149 (1965).
The fact that there are correlations between pretrial detention and subsequent unfavor-
able sentencing does not conclusively establish a causal relationship. It may show that
dangerous or habitual offenders are more likely to be both detained prior to trial and
convicted. However, Rankin's study represents the most thorough effort to control
variables which might affect more severe dispositions. Such factors as prior arrest rec-
ord. the amount of bail (both indicators of dangerousness) and representation by pub-
lic or private counsel (possibility of differential representation effectiveness) were held
constant. Her report concluded: "The results as they now stand, however, do add strong
support to the argument that pretrial detention increases a defendant's chance of re-
ceiving a prison sentence." Rankin. supra, at 655. See also Comment. Preventive De-
tention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1966); Ares. Rankin & Sturz. The Man-
hattan Bail Project: An Interim Report on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 67. 87-88 (1963).
65. The bail hearing after arrest does not give an accused the chance to vindicate
his fourteenth amendment due process rights because in such hearing the magistrate
does not consider whether there is sufficient evidence to charge the person. The only
issue at the bail hearing is the likelihood that the accused will appear for trial. WASH.
JUSTICE CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.09 provides:
(a) Any defendant charged with an offense shall at his first court appearance be
ordered released on his personal recognizance pending trial unless the court de-
termines that such recognizance will not reasonably assure his appearance ....
(b) In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure the defend-
ant's appearance, the court shall, on the available information, consider the rele-
vant facts including: the length and character of the defendant's residence in the
community; his employment status and history and financial conditions; his family
ties and relationships; his reputation, character and mental condition: his history
of response to legal process, his prior criminal record; the willingness of responsi-
ble members of the community to vouch for the defendant's reliability and assist
him in appearing in court; the nature of the charge: and any other factors indi-
cating the defendant's ties to the community.
The bail hearing fails to insure the individual's fourteenth amendment rights because
it does not give him the due process opportunity to rebut the prosecutor's assessment
440
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quires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses."'67 This opportunity is especially important where an arrest
may have been based on incorrect or misleading factual premises.68
The important decision to incarcerate an individual pending trial
should not be made without giving that person an opportunity to es-
tablish the true circumstances of the arrest. In Wisconsin v.
Constantineau69 the Court emphasized that the individual who suf-
fered a deprivation of liberty was not afforded an opportunity to de-
fend herself. This case involved a Wisconsin statute that permitted
designated persons to forbid the sale or gift of liquor to one who had
exhibited certain traits due to excessive drinking (i.e., becoming "dan-
gerous to the peace") by posting notices concerning the individual
around the community. The Court held that although the state had
the power to "post" against an individual, the posting was such a
stigma or badge of disgrace that procedural due process required she
be given an opportunity to be heard.70 This opportunity to defend
oneself against charges was also stressed in North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,71 where Justice Powell stated that the most
of the facts preceding arrest. See In re Walters, 543 P.2d 607, 125 Cal. Rptr. 239
(1975), where the California Supreme Court applied Gerstein to all misdemeanor
post-arrest detentions where defendant wa' not released prior to arraignment, or at
time of arraignment, or did not waive the procedure. Regarding bail, the court stated
that "[t] he mere fixing of bail does not satisfy Gerstein, of course." 543 P.2d at 616,
126 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
66. See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (cafe-
teria worker was refused permission to work on military premises due to failure to
meet security requirements), wherein the Court stated:
The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures uni-
versally applicable to every imaginable situation .... "'[D] ue process,' unlike
some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place and circumstances."
Id. at 895, quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162-63
(1951). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 481.
67. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970) (termination of welfare benefits).
68. See Goldberg v. Kelly, id., determining the proper procedure for terminating
welfare benefits. In Goldberg-the court stated that an effective opportunity to defend
by confronting adverse witnesses and presenting arguments orally was important in
cases where welfare recipients challenged proposed terminations as resting on incorrect
or misleading factual premises or on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of
the particular case. Id. at 268.
69. 400 U.S. 433 (1970).
70. The Court stated:
This appellee was not afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have been
the victim of an official's caprice. Only when the whole proceedings leading to a
pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can oppressive results be pre-
vented.
Id. at 437.
71. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
441
Washington Law Review
compelling deficiency in the garnishment procedure under scrutiny
was the absence of any provision enabling the debtor to obtain
prompt dissolution of the garnishment upon a showing of facts con-
trary to the creditor's affidavit: "Georgia law does not authorize the
alleged debtor to question facts contained in the garnishor's affidavit
or to make contrary submission of fact indicating that the garnishor's
apprehension of possible loss is misconceived or is insufficient to war-
rant the. . . garnishment. ' 72 Because of this deficiency, Justice Powell
felt that the statutory provisions failed to afford fairness in their accom-
modation of the respective interests of creditor and debtor.
Similarly, the important decision to infringe on an individual's lib-
erty by imposing the criminal process should not be made without
affording the individual an opportunity to establish the true circum-
stances of an arrest. It is here that the distinction between probable
cause to arrest and probable cause to incarcerate (charge) becomes
most clear. Although it is firmly established that the policeman has the
power to arrest an individual without inquiring into the accused's side
of the story, the circumstances resulting in arrest may be so mis-
leading that the arrestee's mere explanation would result in the rea-
sonable conclusion that there was insufficient evidence to charge the
arrestee. Incarceration of the individual should occur only after such
inquiry is made.
D. Due Process Adversary Proceedings Are Required for Parole
Revocation
In Morrissey v. Brewer73 the Court weighed the interests of the state
against those of a parolee and determined that the parolee should be
afforded a factual inquiry into the reason for his detention and a de-
termination of whether there existed probable cause to detain pending
future parole revocation proceedings. The petitioner in Morrissey had
been convicted and sentenced to seven years confinement but was re-
leased on parole. Seven months after his release he was arrested for
alleged violations of the terms of his parole and was placed in the
county jail. On the basis of his parole officer's report, petitioner's pa-
role was revoked, and he was returned to the penitentiary. Petitioner
72. Id. at 726 n.6 (Powell. J., concurring in the judgment).
73. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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challenged this procedure, alleging that it violated the fourteenth
amendment due process clause because he had not been afforded a
hearing.74
In its analysis the Morrissey Court distinguished a preliminary
hearing to determine probable cause to hold the parolee from a subse-
quent parole revocation proceeding, holding, inter alia, that due pro-
cess requires a preliminary hearing by an impartial hearing officer to
determine whether reasonable grounds exist for detaining the parolee
pending revocation hearing. The Court concluded that termination of
parole inflicts a "grievous loss" on the individual75 and that while
there is an overwhelming state interest in taking into custody a parolee
suspected of violating his parole conditions, there is no state interest in
revoking parole without procedural guarantees.
The Court held that the parolee should be allowed to present rele-
vant evidence and witnesses and to question adverse informants at the
hearing. If after hearing the evidence the officer determined that suffi-
cient grounds existed, the parolee could be detained pending the revo-
cation proceeding.76 Thus, the preliminary hearing deemed necessary
by the Court was in the nature of an adversary hearing.
The Morrissey rationale, which protects parolees' conditional
freedom from incarceration, should be applied to persons threatened
with deprivation of their unconditional liberty. The issues involved in
Morrissey and Gerstein are, in the broadest sense, the same: whether
probable cause exists to detain a person pending further proceedings.
The results reached in the two cases differ because of the different
constitutional bases relied upon by the Court. The Morrissey Court
based its decision on due process and held that the detention issue
should be resolved by inquiry into, and verification of, the facts al-
leged by the state.77 The Gerstein Court rejected the Morrissey par-
allel and rested its decision on the fourth amendment, requiring only
that the issue of continued detention be resolved according to the ar-
74. Id. at 472-73.
75. Id. at 482.
76. The parole revocation process has two stages. At the preliminary hearing a
determination must be made that there is probable cause to believe the parolee vio-
lated parole. The actual revocation hearing follows where a final evaluation of con-
tested facts and a decision whether revocation is warranted must be made. Due proc-
ess procedural safeguards are also required at the subsequent revocation hearing. The
parolee must have an opportunity to show that parole conditions were not violated, or
if they were, that the circumstances do not warrant revocation. See 408 U.S. at 485-88.
77. Id. at 484.
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rest standard and finding no need for "further investigation" into the
facts.78
The Court did not require a specific procedure for the probable
cause determination; it stated merely that the nature of the determina-
tion "will be shaped to accord with a state's pretrial procedure viewed
as a whole."' 79 It suggested that the determination of probable cause to
arrest as well as to detain could be made at the accused's first appear-
ance before a judicial officer, or on affidavits or testimony in the pres-
ence of the accused.8 0 Obviously, such procedures would not be as
protective of the accused's interests as would a Morrissey-type hearing
or a full preliminary hearing with representation by counsel.
Consequently, in two similar situations--detention pending parole
revocation and post-arrest detention-a person may be deprived of
liberty. In the first, deprivation is deemed serious enough for due pro-
78. 420 U.S. at 120 n.21.
79. Id. at 123.
80. Id. at 123--24. The City of Seattle, in response to a Gerstein-based suit in fed-
eral court brought by the Seattle-King County Public Defenders Association (Fultz v.
Waldt. No. C75-466S (Wash. Super. Ct., King County. Nov. 19, 1975) has set up a
new pretrial procedure. The procedure was agreed upon out of court by the Public
Defender and the City of Seattle. Beginning August 11. 1975, the procedure required
that each arrestee appear before a judicial officer, with an attorney present, within 24
hours after arrest. The police report containing circumstances surrounding the individ-
ual's arrest will be used to determine if probable cause for the arrest existed. This new
procedure is viewed as being most useful in that the attorney will have an opportunity
to argue that the arrestee should be released on personal recognizance (without bail).
In the period from August 18, 1975 to February 17. 1976, 70 cases out of 589 cases
on the calendar were argued on the basis of lack of probable cause, and of those 70.
23 arrestees were released for lack of probable cause. In the same period, 220 of the
589 arrestees were released on personal recognizance. Interview with Larry Lund. Law
Reform Attorney for Seattle-King County Public Defender Officer in Seattle. Wash-
ington. February 17, 1976.
King County prosecutors are responding to the requirements of Gerstein by attach-
ing an extra affidavit to the information or complaint (if in Justice Court) upon filing.
Interview with David Boerner. Chief Criminal Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, King
County in Seattle. Washington, Feb. 20. 1976. Mr. Boerner stated that after nearly a
year of Gerstein procedure probable cause has been found lacking in no case.
An amendment to WASH. SUPER. CT. (CRIM.) R. 2.2(a) also has been proposed to
comply with Gerstein:
When an information is filed a warrant shall issue on an affidavit or affidavits or
sworn testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant. If the judge
finds that probable cause for the issuance of a warrant exists, he shall issue a war-
rant. The finding of probable cause shall be based on evidence, which may be
hearsay in whole or in part provided there is a substantial basis for believing the
source of the hearsay to be credible and for believing that there is factual basis
for the information furnished. Before ruling on a request for a warrant the court
may require the affiant to appear personally and may examine under oath the
affiant and any witnesses he may produce. The warrant shall be directed to any
peace officer and may be served at any time.
Washington Supreme Court. Proposed Court Rules, Sept. 1975. at 10. As of February
20. 1976. the rule had not yet been approved by the state supreme court.
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cess to require an adversary proceeding and verification of alleged
facts; in the second, a lesser degree of protection is afforded, arid an
accused may be incarcerated as the result of an informal proceeding
not even requiring his presence.
The Supreme Court sought to distinguish Gerstein from Morrissey
by focusing on the differences between a parole revocation hearing
and a criminal trial, and by emphasizing the evidence-preserving as-
pects of a preliminary hearing in the parole context. The Court ob-
served that revocation proceedings are more prone to initial error than
is the "more formal criminal process, where violations are defined by
statute and the prosecutor has a professional duty not to charge a sus-
pect with a crime unless he is satisfied of probable cause." 81 These
reasons offered by the Court do not seem adequate to justify denying
an arrestee the chance to defend himself and avoid pretrial incarcera-
tion, for the interests of the parolee and the arrestee are the same, viz.,
avoiding detention pending later proceedings. To state that the crim-
inal process is more accurate because prosecutors do not charge
without probable cause seems to be embracing the theory of "proce-
dure by presumption," 82 and does not leave room for judging each
case on its facts. To state that the criminal process is more accurate
because violations are defined by statute is short-sighted. While it is
true that a parolee may be given the vague instruction to stay out of
"areas of prostitution," he or she may also be specifically warned not
to carry a weapon or associate with specific people. In contrast, a non-
parolee may be arrested for such crimes as vagrancy, loitering, prowl-
ing, disturbing the peace, or soliciting, all defined at least as vaguely
as some parole conditions.83
81. 420 U.S. at 122 n.22, citing ABA CODE OF- PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
7-103(A).
82. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
83. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972), where the City's
vagrancy ordinance was held void for vagueness in that the ordinance placed "unfet-
tered discretion ... in the hands of the . . . police," id. at 168, and permits an arbi-
trary and discriminatory enforcement of the law, id. at 170. In Papachristou the Court
stated:
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent
houses where liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look
suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule
of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards-that
crime is being nipped in the bud-is too extravagant to deserve extended treat-
ment.
Id. at 171. See also Bellevue v. Miller, 85 Wn. 2d 539, 536 P.2d 603 (1975), where
the Washington Supreme Court held a prowling ordinance unconstitutionally vague:
"A determination of whether particular activity manifests an unlawful purpose or
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Although it is undoubtedly true that a parolee's preliminary hearing
to determine probable cause serves the purpose of gathering and pre-
serving live testimony for a subsequent revocation proceeding, this
distinction is also less than convincing. The preliminary hearing could
also serve the evidence-gathering purpose for the Gerstein accused.
More important, the accused's primary interest, as well as the pa-
rolee's, is to avoid pretrial detention. The attempt to distinguish Mor-
rissey fails because of the basic flaw in reasoning evidenced by the
Court's choice of constitutional protections-that is, a narrow appli-
cation of fourth amendment arrest doctrine, rather than the more flex-
ible analysis of the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
In Gerstein the Court should have engaged in the balancing proce-
dure typical of fourteenth amendment due process analysis. It should
have weighed the individual's interest in avoiding pretrial detention
against the state's interest in incarcerating without procedural safe-
guards. Instead, the Court merely stated: "That standard-probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally has
been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on
hearsay and written testimony," and the Court has approved these
informal modes of proof.8 4
E. Due Process Adversary Proceedings Are Required for Welfare
Benefit Revocation
The Supreme Court decision in Goldberg v. Kelly85 also lends sup-
port to the application of a fourteenth amendment due process bal-
ancing analysis to the Gerstein situation. In Goldberg, New York resi-
dents receiving welfare benefits alleged that their aid benefits were
about to be terminated without prior notice and hearing and that con-
sequently they were being denied due process. The Court held that the
due process framework applied to termination of welfare benefits and
that the interest of the recipient in receiving uninterrupted aid out-
weighed the increase in the state's administrative and fiscal burdens.
creates alarm is entirely dependent upon a police officer's opinion .... Such extravagant
police discretion is plainly improper." 85 Wn. 2d at 544-45. 536 P.2d at 607.
84. 420 U.S. at 120. To support this observation, the Court quoted from Brinegar
v. United States. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). a fourth amendment search and seizure case
dealing with a motion to suppress evidence.
85. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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As to what procedural safeguards were due them, the Court again, as
in Morrissey, required an evidentiary hearing before the deprivation
of benefits, in addition to the full administrative review accorded in
the statutory post-termination hearing.86 The Court held that due pro-
cess requires that a welfare recipient be given adequate notice of the
termination proceeding, an opportunity to present evidence and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses, the right to retain counsel, and
an impartial decisionmaker who must state the reasons for his deter-
mination and indicate which evidence he relied upon.87
But for their outcomes, the Gerstein, Morrissey, and Goldberg
cases are quite similar. The parolee in Morrissey and the welfare re-
cipient in Goldberg were each afforded a constitutionally guaranteed
opportunity to immediately halt the procedure that was threatening
their respective benefits, conditional freedom and monetary aid. This
opportunity was held to have been required by the fourteenth amend-
ment despite the fact that in each case a fully developed adversary
procedure followed. It was deemed necessary because the immediate
deprivation suffered by the individual was considered to outweigh the
state's interest in avoiding additional hearings. Certainly the presump-
tively innocent Gerstein arrestee had as much interest in preserving his
immediate freedom as had a parolee in retaining his conditional
freedom or a welfare recipient in receiving a living allowance. Had it
applied a fourteenth amendment due process analysis, the Court
would have been obliged to require a post-arrest hearing for the Ger-
stein arrestee.
F. Due Process Adversary Proceedings Are Required for Taking of
Debtors' Property
It is also pertinent to consider the Court's recent treatment of cases
involving deprivation of property by garnishment, replevin, or seques-
86. The Court stated:
We bear in mind that the statutory "fair hearing" will provide the recipient with
a full administrative review. Accordingly, the pre-termination hearing has one
function only: to produce an initial determination of the validity of the welfare
department's grounds for discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recip-
ient against an erroneous termination of his benefits.
Id. at 266-67.
87. Id. at 267-71.
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tration. The cases of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,88 Fuentes v.
Shevin,89 Mitchell v. W.T. Grant, Co.,90 and North Georgia Finish-
ing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.91 all dealt with the amount of due process
afforded a debtor before deprivation of property by a creditor. Re-
garding these cases, one commentator has concluded that when both a
secured creditor and a debtor have interests in the same goods, bal-
ancing their rights would result in requiring a procedure similar to
that upheld in Mitchell92 The Mitchell case requires that the creditor
obtain a writ issued by a judge upon a clear showing of entitlement
and a demonstration that the debtor has power to conceal or dispose
of the property prior to the sequestration. After sequestration of the
property by the court, the defendant debtor has the opportunity to
immediately file a motion to dissolve the writ.9 3 In this manner the
statutory procedure in Mitchell constitutionally accommodated the
conflicting interests of the creditor and debtor. In contrast, where the
debtor has full legal title to the property and garnishment is sought by
an unsecured creditor, Sniadach, and arguably Di-Chem,94 require the
opportunity for an adversary hearing prior to garnishment. 95
88. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (Wisconsin statute permitting prejudgment wage garnish-
ment without notice or opportunity for hearing held unconstitutional as violative of
due process).
89. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin statutes providing for issuance, upon secured
party's ex parte application, of a writ authorizing seizure by state agents of alleged
debtor's property violative of due process).
90. 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (sequestration constitutional without prior notice and
hearing where writ issues only on clear showing of entitlement and debtor could imme-
diately request dissolution of the writ).
91. 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (prejudgment garnishment by unsecured creditor of cor-
poration's bank account without prior notice and hearing violative of due process).
92. In Comment. Justice White's Chemistry: The Mitchellization of Fuentes. 50
WASH. L. REV. 901 (1975), the author states:
The Mitchell Court introduced the use of a balancing test only in the context of
secured transactions, where there are mutual property interests in goods. Where.
as in the case of unsecured transactions, the debtor has "full legal title" to the
property in question, a balancing approach is simply inappropriate.
Read together, Di-Chem, Fuentes and Sniadach suggest that states will be required
to provide for notice and opportunity for an adversary hearing prior to prejudg-
ment garnishment (and by analogy attachment) by an unsecured creditor. In the
context of secured transactions Mitchell remains controlling even after Di-Chem.
Should a state fail to provide the full range of safeguards outlined in Mitchell and
reiterated in Di-Chem's discussion of Mitchell, it would then apparently be re-
quired to comply with the stricter Fuentes guidelines governing judicial reposses-
sions by unsecured creditors.
Id. at 908-09. 910 (footnotes omitted).
93. LA. CODE CIv. PRO. art. 3506 (1960). Dissolution of the writ must be ordered
unless the creditor proves the grounds on which the writ was issued.
94. The Court's reliance on Fuentes v. Shevin indicates that notice and an oppor-
tunity for hearing is still required prior to garnishment. 419 U.S. at 605-06. The
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Applying this analysis to the arrestee's situation results in the dis-
covery that property rights are better protected than an individual's
right to freedom. 96 Analogizing from Mitchell, one can conclude that
since the individual and the state both have an interest in the freedom
of the individual being held pending trial the arrestee should be enti-
tled to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution of the
arrest absent proof by the prosecution of the grounds on which it was
made. 97
In considering this analogy it is again important to note the distincz
tion between initial seizure and continuing detention (of property or
person). Justice Powell, concurring in Di-Chem, reasoned from the
Court's decision in Mitchell that the most compelling deficiency in the
procedure under scrutiny in Di-Chem was the failure to provide a
"prompt and adequate post-garnishment hearing."' 8 He noted that
garnishment may impose serious hardships on the debtor and there-
fore the state procedure must include a provision enabling the debtor
to obtain prompt dissolution of garnishment upon an appropriate
showing of fact.99 Although the Court may ultimately conclude in
garnishment cases, as it did in the context of sequestration in Mit-
chell, that the initial seizure of property may, in some circumstances,
be made without an adversary hearing preceding it, there must be
provision for the individual to have an immediate opportunity to re-
verse the process once begun. 100 It is illogical to conclude that a re-
Court, however, carefully framed its analysis in terms of "an early hearing" instead of
"pregarnishment" hearing, leaving room for a later determination that an immediate
post-garnishment hearing would qualify as "an early hearing."
95. For a further discussion of the constitutional framework constructed by the
Court for the prejudgment accommodation of the conflicting rights of creditors and
debtors see Comment, supra note 92.
96. This also appears to have been Justice Stewart's point when he remarked in
his Gerstein concurrence:
-I see no need in this case for the Court to say that the Constitution extends less
procedural protection to an imprisoned human being than is required to test the
propriety of garnisheeing a commercial bank account,.., the custody of a refrig-
erator .... the temporary suspension of a public school student .... or the sus-
pension of a driver's license ....
420 U.S. at 127.
97. See Di-Chern, 419 U.S. at 607, where the Court distinguishes Mitchell by not-
ing that "[t] he Louisiana law [involved in Mitchll] ... expressly entitled the debtor
to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution of the writ absent proof by
the creditor on the grounds on which the writ was issued."
98. 419 U.S. at 613.
99. Id. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
100. This was the position taken by Justice Powell in Di-Chem. He further noted
that except in cases where garnishment would drive the unfortunate debtor "to the
wall," pregarnishment notice and a prior hearing are not constitutionally mandated.
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frigerator receives more protection than an incarcerated individual. In
order to protect his or her property, an individual is given either the
opportunity before seizure to be heard at an adversary hearing, or an
opportunity after seizure to immediately reverse the process. The ar-
restee deprived of his freedom, however, is given neither.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Gerstein Court failed to determine that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment requires a judicially-supervised adver-
sary hearing immediately after arrest. This hearing would ensure the
accused an opportunity to be heard at the earliest possible time and
provide an opportunity for the accused's interest in personal freedom
to be balanced against the state's interest in his extended post-arrest
detention. A criminal prosecution should therefore proceed in three
stages: arrest, pretrial, and trial. At each of these stages the prosecu-
tion's burden would increase. In the first, the prosecution must show
probable cause to arrest; in the second, a higher standard of probable
cause to hold for trial (probable cause to charge) should be met; and,
in the third, the prosecution must prove the state's case beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. Only through the adoption of this procedure will arres-
tees' constitutional rights be fully protected.
Cynthia B. Whitaker
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419 U.S. at 610-11. The majority, however, whether motivated by stare decisis or
otherwise, made no attempt to relegate Sniadach to the narrow factual setting of pre-
judgment wage garnishment. After relying on Fuentes (requiring pre-replevin notice
and an opportunity for hearing), the Court stated: "The Georgia [garnishment] stat-
ute is vulnerable for the same reasons." Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
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